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Abstract 
This paper proposes and explains the application of an accident precursor probabilistic method (APPM) 
that aims to overcome the usual limitations of existing quantitative risk analyses (QRA), with a focus on 
offshore drilling blowouts. This limitation is implicit in generic QRAs that do not appropriately reflect the 
specificities of the rig and its environment, without considering systems arrangements, risk influencing 
factors (RIF) or current operational conditions.  
The proposed method is divided into three pillars: (i) a guideline for modeling the blowout probability 
considering specific conditions or well, rig, safety barriers and risk influencing factors (RIF) objectives; (ii) 
a proposed axiom combined with a scoring system to quantify the RIF into the QRA; and (iii) a risk based 
plan framework, to allow risk update and sequential learning during the operational phase.   
The APPM is based on a Bayesian Network (BN) mathematical framework. It allows the pre-defined axiom 
to be entered into a conditional probability table (CPT). This approach, combined with the assessment of 
the company’s safety management system, allows the incorporation of RIF into the QRA.  
The developed APPM is applied to a theoretical micro-scale calculation. The result demonstrates its 
suitability for addressing common aspects inherent to the blowout phenomenon, including uncertainty, 
dependability between variables (common cause factors and redundant failures), and dynamism due to 
planned or unplanned operational changes in systems, drilling parameters and current conditions of RIF. 
Limitations of the APPM are also identified, and suggestions are made for future work on this topic. 
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List of Definitions and Abbreviations 
BN – Bayesian Network 
BOP – Blowout Preventer 
BT – Bow Tie 
CPT – Conditional Probability Table 
DAG – Direct Acyclic Graph 
ET – Event Tree  
FT – Fault Tree  
G&G – Geological and geophysical parameters 
HOF – Human and Organizational Factors 
KPI – Key Performance Indicator 
MoC - Management of Change 
MTTF – Mean Time to Failure 
QRA – Quantitative Risk Analysis 
RIF – Risk Influencing Factors 
SMS – Safety Management System 
 
List of symbols 
 
Ci Random variable of potential cause Ci. 
Ei A set of random events or, when used in the risk analysis model, a set of basic events. 
E Random variable characterizes the evidence in the Bayesian theorem. 
ph Hydrostatic pressure caused by the mud column inside the well.  
pf Pressure caused by the fluids that are stored inside the pores of a geological formation. 
P Probability 
R(t) Reliability of a system or piece of equipment over a period of time t. 
𝜆 Failure rate of a system or piece of equipment 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Offshore drilling is an activity inherent to the oil and gas industry, as it is essential in confirming the 
economic feasibility of hydrocarbon reservoirs. However, risks related to uncertainties, i.e: lack of 
knowledge about risk influence factors (RIF), and risks inherent to typical major accident hazards are 
associated with this activity. Blowouts are assumed to be one of the major contributors to risk in offshore 
drilling (Rosenberg & Nielsen, 1997).  
The risks inherent to drilling projects are assessed prior to and during operations. Risk assessment studies 
are part of the regulatory framework in several countries and are critical documents for the permit process 
for drilling activities. For instance, the UK Health and Safety Executive (UK) (Health and Safety Executive, 
2006) states that the primary objectives of risk assessment in this context are to identify and rank risks so 
that they can be adequately managed, and to examine associated risk reduction measures to determine those 
which are most suitable for implementation.  
On new frontiers, most exploratory blocks and potential reservoirs are generally located in deep waters and 
unknown geological and geophysical (G&G) environments. This requires design and construction of wells 
under complex, hazard conditions (high pressures and temperatures) and with higher degrees of uncertainty, 
leading to the conclusion that the blowout risk also increases. According to the National Commission 
(Skelet et al., 2006b) on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, the Macondo blowout 
requires a reassessment of the risks associated with the activity of offshore drilling. 
Nevertheless, the current practice in the oil & gas industry has been to assess the risks of complex drilling 
projects based on the same traditional QRA methods that are applied to common drilling projects, with a 
lesser degree of complexity and uncertainty, i.e: where wells have standard designs and are located in 
environments where geological and geophysical (G&G) information is readily available. In cases when 
wells are designed under uncertainty and risk, deterministic safety factors are seldom applied to estimate 
the risk and, in some cases, may even discontinue the project (Dahlin et al., 1998). 
Traditional QRA methods are characterized by relying on traditional statistical techniques and, as 
consequence, are limited in addressing dependability, uncertainty and changes in the risk picture overtime 
(risk update) (Aven & Bjerga, 2009). These methods may be suitable for assessing regular drilling projects, 
but when applied to complex, risky and dynamic drilling projects, it generates generic risk assessments that 
are not reliable in reflecting specifics that could significantly change the risk profile of the activity. 
This research paper proposes an accident precursor probabilistic method (APPM) that was designed for 
overcoming the limitations of traditional QRA, with a focus on addressing specificities related to blowout 
risk in deep-water offshore drilling. Therefore, the following specifications for the APPM were established: 
address specificities of well and top-side safety barrier systems and elements, easily reflect changes in 
drilling operational conditions and properly reflect the effect of risk influencing factors (RIF) on the 
performance of safety barriers.  
This research paper is divided into the following sections: 
 Review of traditional and contemporary QRA methods, focusing on the oil and gas industry; 
 Presentation of the APPM, including expected advantages and limitations; 
 Demonstration and discussion of its application in a micro-scale theoretical example; 
 Discussion about the APPM’s limitations and suggestions for future research work; and  
 Conclusions; 
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2. REVIEW OF OFFSHORE QRA METHODS 
The IADC HSE Case Guidelines (International Association of Drilling Contractors, 2015) are the present 
benchmark for offshore drilling risk assessment.  The Guidelines provide a framework for developing an 
integrated health, safety and environmental management system for use in reducing the risks associated 
with drilling activities. The guidelines are divided into the following major parts: 
 Drilling contractor management system; 
 RIG/ MODU description and support information; 
 Risk management; 
 Emergency response; and 
 Performance monitoring. 
The HSE Case Guidelines demonstrate that risks associated with major and other workplace hazards have 
been adequately assessed and that risk-reducing controls within the drilling contractor’s management 
system have been applied (International Association of Drilling Contractors, 2015). IADC HSE Guidelines 
are the outcome of good practices for drilling contractors. Even though they are not compulsory, they are a 
standardized aspect of HSE that operators, drilling contractors, authorities, and oil and gas producers 
(industry stakeholders) should consider as part of their Health, Safety and Environmental (HSE) 
Management Systems.  
They are also a methodology for drilling contractors to acknowledge the application and requirements of 
operations aligned with other offshore international standards, such as International Safety Management 
Code requirements (ISM) of the International Maritime Organization (IMO).  They are a risk management 
tools which helps to demonstrate the compliance of agreed HSE-applicable regulations with stakeholders’ 
expectations. This is especially useful when drilling contractors operate in different global regulatory 
jurisdictions (Holand, 1997). 
The challenge when modeling a blowout hazard is to conduct an analysis which reflects the actual 
equipment and procedures that are being used. Commonly utilized models are unable to distinguish between 
different platforms, systems and operators(Vinnem, 2007). In addition, the models used for quantification 
are not suitable for dealing with significant levels of operational uncertainty and changes, which are also 
inherent to most drilling projects. This combination leads to generic and static risk analyses. 
A review of several studies (Skogdalen & Vinnem, 2012), reinforced by the author’s own professional 
experience, has identified the following limitations of blowout QRAs: 
 Blowout risk assessments are generic. They do not reflect the specific risk influence factors (RIF) of 
the project, mainly those related to human and organizational factors (HOF) (Skogdalen & Vinnem, 
2011); 
 They are strongly dependent upon historical accident data banks that don’t address the uncertainty 
or specificities of the project. However, in some cases the frequencies can be adjusted based on the 
types of operations(International Association of Oil and Gas Producers, 2010); 
 They are modeled using a set of event trees (ET) and fault trees (FT), without considering 
dependability effects on the calculations, as demonstrated by (Khakzad et al., 2013); 
 Risk assessments are static, as the risk is not updated in light of operational changes and new 
information that becomes available (Khan et al., 2016); 
The risk models also do not address the specificities inherent to the basic causes of a kick, which is the 
major blowout accident precursor. In addition, quantification is limited to a review of accident frequency 
data banks that, in most cases, are not adjusted for the specificities of the system and operations. As a 
consequence, specific risk influencing factors (RIF) of geology, equipment, systems, and human and 
organizational factors (HOF) are not considered in the risk model, as already discussed by Skogdalen & 
Vinnem (2011, 2012) and Vinnem (2007). These findings are also in line with the limitations of QRA 
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applied to chemical process industries, as presented by Villa et al. (2016), who highlight that conventional 
risk analysis methodologies suffer the disadvantage of being intrinsically static, which may preclude 
possible updates and integrations with overall average risk. For this reason, during the past decade, great 
effort has been devoted to the development of dynamic assessment and management approaches that 
consider the evolution of conditions affecting risk. 
These contemporary approaches are mostly designed for chemical process industries, but some of them are 
derived from the nuclear industry. Villa et al. (2016) presents an overview on how risk analysis 
methodologies and applications have rapidly evolved in a dynamic direction (Dynamic Risk Analysis), to 
address risk issues in a continuously evolving environment and to overcome the limitations of traditional 
techniques. 
Khan et al. (2016), investigated the main contributions in the areas of Dynamic Risk Assessment (DRA) 
and proposes an overall framework for dynamic risk management for process facilities. The update 
mechanism, advantages, and disadvantages of the following methods were addressed:  Bayesian network, 
dynamic bow-ties, principal component analysis (PCA), loss functions, and risk barometer. The authors 
highlight the existence of improvement opportunities in technical aspects of the DRA field, especially for 
overcoming the inherent structural limitations of the Bayesian Network (BN) which is broadly used, as it 
does not allow consideration of multivariate systems with different marginal distributions and complex 
non-linear dependencies.  
Paltrinieri et al. (2016) reviewed, analyzed, and classified different risk assessment approaches, then 
presented their limitations for application to the process industry. The work highlights the application of a 
novel method based on indicators, the Risk Barometer, that demonstrated valuable features in its first 
applications, as it is capable of continuously monitoring risk-picture changes and supporting decision 
makers on a daily basis. However, the method requires the availability of a large amount of real-time data, 
the collection of which is made easier by the extensive use of information and communication technologies 
in process systems. 
In addition, Paltrinieri et al. (2016) suggests that the incorporation of Bayesian Network (BN) into risk 
assessment may be another interesting focus for both research and industry purposes, mostly because it 
allows a systematic approach that considers human error and management influences. Ale et al. (2014) also 
highlights the BN capability of providing a useful tool for dealing with uncertainty and with information 
from different sources, such as expert judgment, observable information or experience, and common causes 
and influences of human factors (Paltrinieri et al., 2016).  
Drilling projects may differ in many aspects when compared to chemical process systems, mostly in terms 
of the degree of automation and process stability. Chemical processes have well-defined design and 
operational envelopes, combined with relatively automated instrumentation systems. However, in drilling, 
operational parameters are mostly related to operational performance and Geological and Geophysical 
(G&G) conditions. In addition, instrumentation is less automated and consequently the drilling system’s 
reliability is more dependent upon human and organizational factors (HOF). This combination of 
uncertainty, planned and unplanned changes in the well operations, and a significant degree of dependency 
on human and organizational factors (HOF) when compared to other high reliability industries, makes 
drilling and consequently blowout risk assessment and management, a quite singular subject.  
Extensive reviews and studies (Reason, 1997) have already estimated that 70% of offshore accidents happen 
due to human failures and the remaining 30% is attributed to technical failures (Cai et al., 2013). 
Specifically, in the Macondo well blowout, there were a series of technical mistakes, bad engineering 
judgements, improper maintenance and communication, lack of leadership, structure, and component 
failures that all contributed to the tragedy (Pranesh et al., 2017). 
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Specific approaches for the oil & gas sector have also been a focus of the scientific field, dedicated to 
improving current QRA methods. A brief review of some of these modern methods, capable of updating 
risk and/ or incorporating RIF into the QRA with a focus on the oil and gas sector, is provided as follows: 
 Khakzad et al. (2013) present a risk analysis of drilling operations using both bow-tie and Bayesian 
network approaches. Bayesian network is shown to take priority over bow-tie since: (i) it considers 
both common cause failures and conditional dependencies among the primary events of the well 
control system; (ii) it allows probability updates and sequential learning by considering accident 
precursors, and (iii) it also helps to identify the most probable sequence of events leading to a 
blowout.  
 Khakzad et al. (2014) present a Bow-tie analysis and real-time barrier failure probability assessment 
of offshore drilling operations involving subsurface Blowout Preventers. The Bow-tie model is 
used to represent the potential accident scenarios, their causes, and the associated consequences. 
Real time predictive models are developed for the failure probabilities of key blowout barriers using 
a physical reliability model of constant strength and random stress to allow risk updates using real-
time observed data. 
 Abimbola et al. (2014) illustrate the application of a precursor-based hierarchical Bayesian analysis 
for updating the risk of major accidents, examining two types of likelihood functions (binomial and 
multinomial distributions). The method was applied in a case study, updating the failure probability 
of traditional offshore blowouts’ safety barriers. 
 (Ahmad, Pontiggia, & Demichela, 2014) propose a Bayesian methodology (MEDIA) to incorporate 
human and organizational factors into the risk assessment of technical systems. In MEDIA, a 
Bayesian Network combines a set of organizational factors classified into two states (good or bad) 
with a set of human factor taxonomies. The model can be used in two possible ways: (i) if an 
industry provides states of organizational factors to calculate HOF risks, or (ii) if they evaluate 
different organizational characteristics to compare HOF risks associated with specific 
organizational structures, to recommend the most suitable solution for an industry. 
 Landucci & Paltrinieri (2016a, 2016b) propose the TEC20 method (frequency modification 
methodology based on Technical Operational and Organizational Factors), which is based on an 
aggregated set of indicators, and their contribution to the expected leak frequency is systematically 
evaluated though a specific procedure. The method is suitable for implementation in dynamic risk 
assessments to provide an update mechanism that allows revision of accident frequency during the 
lifecycle of an installation. This work also compares TEC20 with other relevant methods for 
frequency tailoring, such as: CCPS Method (Center of Chemical Process Safety, 2000) based on 
arbitrary expert judgment evaluation; API 581 Method (American Petroleum Institute, 2000), 
which is based on the determination of equipment and management modification factors obtained 
from design data and site inspection; MANAGER (Pitblado, Williams, & Slater, 1990) which is 
based on the determination of a management modification factor obtained from site inspection, 
implicitly covering technical aspects; and DNV (Pitblado, Bain, Falck, Litland, & Spitzenberger, 
2011) which is based on scoring safety barriers, obtaining frequency reduction factors, and 
implicitly covering managerial aspects. 
Regarding human factors specifically, for about a decade the oil and gas industry have been looking for 
alternatives to incorporating HOF into QRA, as verified by the 2010 OGP report (International Association 
of Oil and Gas Producers, 2010). More recently, successful projects have been implemented in this specific 
area, such as Risk OMT program (Vinnem et al., 2012) that represent a further development of Barrier and 
Operational Risk Analysis (BORA) (Aven et al., 2006; Skelet et al., 2006a, 2006b).  
BORA (Skelet et al., 2006a, 2006b) analyses the effect of safety barriers introduced to prevent hydrocarbon 
releases, and how platforms’ specific conditions of technical, human, operational, and organizational risk 
influencing factors influence barrier performance. This work was based on the general framework and 
definition of safety barrier systems and elements suggested by (Sklet, 2006), which is also adopted in the 
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context of the present research paper. (Sklet, 2006) defines safety barriers as physical and/or non-physical 
measures planned to prevent, control or mitigate undesired events or accidents. The measures may range 
from human actions or a single technical unit, to a complex socio-technical system. ‘Planned’ implies that 
at least one of the purposes of the measures is to reduce risk. In line with (ISO 13702, 2015), ‘prevent’ 
means to reduce the likelihood of a hazardous event, ‘control’ means to limit the extent and/or duration of 
a hazardous event to prevent escalation, and ‘mitigate’ means to reduce the effects of a hazardous event.  
A ‘barrier element’ is a component or subsystem of a barrier system that itself is not sufficient to perform 
the designed safety function, and ‘risk influencing factor’ (RIF) is any factor, whether technical or human 
and organizational (HOF), capable of affecting the performance of a barrier function by affecting an element 
or system (Sklet, 2006). 
The Risk OTM method (Vinnem et al., 2012) departs from the safety barrier framework introduced by 
BORA (Skelet et al., 2006a, 2006b), taking advantage of a Bayesian approach combined with a scoring 
system for modelling human influences on both an operational and organizational level on offshore process 
leaks, focusing on maintenance work. The evaluation of the method’s application in this context was 
demonstrated by (Gran et al., 2012).  
More recently, (Strand & Lundteingen, 2016)  applied the principles of Risk OMT to offshore drilling 
operations, with a focus on quantifying human reliability. The authors concluded that the method is still 
novel for well drilling human reliability analysis (HRA) and QRA, but may need further empirical 
validation to demonstrate it has the necessary reliability to be a practical tool for risk management in global 
offshore drilling operations. The same authors (Strand & Lundteingen, 2016) suggest that there are 
improvement opportunities in regard to limiting the number of assumptions, and the use of expert judgments 
to substitute observations such as field data, human resource data, and simulator training data. 
The proposed accident precursor Bayesian Network (BN) method for modeling the risk of deep-drilling 
blowouts suggested by this research paper also takes advantage of these works, especially Risk OMT 
(Vinnem et al., 2012), since it employs a Bayesian approach to allow risk updates based on the effect of 
RIF in the performance of safety barriers.  
The major differences between Risk OMT and the APPM are the following: (i) the procedure for 
quantifying the effect of the RIF and integrating it into the QRA (scoring system and axiom); (ii) the 
proposed modeling approach divided into three levels; and the proposed risk update mechanism (risk-based 
plan). 
 
3. APPM FOR MODELING AND ASSESSING THE RISK OF OFFSHORE 
DRILLING BLOWOUTS 
The APPM for modeling and assessing the risk of drilling blowouts relies on the pillars illustrated in Figure 
1.  
   
   
8 
 
 
Figure 1: Pillars of the proposed risk-assessment method. 
 
The Bayesian Network method (BN) is the mathematical framework that integrates all pillars presented by 
Figure 1, allowing them to: decode the proposed axiom into a simple mathematical rule; address 
dependability between random variables, including common cause RIF affecting the performance of a 
safety barrier; and implement sequential learning and risk updates based upon new evidence collected by 
the routine implementation of SMS. Each one of these pillars was defined in accordance with the previously 
mentioned specifications of the design method: 
 Three-level modeling (Section 3.1) consists of simple guidelines to facilitate modelling, in 
accordance with the specifications of the proposed method. It assures that specificities inherent to 
drilling projects, including safety critical barrier elements and RIF, are properly identified; 
 The axiom and scoring system (Section 3.2) were designed to allow the incorporation of RIF into 
QRA, in a simpler and more transparent way when compared with similar Bayesian methods; 
 The design and implementation of a customized risk-based plan (Section 3.3), aligning the 
company’s Safety Management Systems (SMS) with the axiom and scoring system allows risk 
updating and sequential learning based on operational changes and the observation of new evidence. 
 
3.1 Three-Level Modeling Guidelines 
The three-level modeling guidelines were organized in accordance with three distinct modeling objectives. 
The three-level modeling guidelines are presented in Table 1.  
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Table 1: Three-level modeling guidelines. 
Level Objective Modeling Guidelines 
1 
To reflect specific risks related to 
the well drilling phase and well 
operations. 
 Customize a generic blowout model for reflecting a 
specific drilling phase, accounting for G&G risk 
exposure and arrangements of blowout safety 
critical systems. 
 In 100% of the cases, the kick is the blowout major 
accident precursor (Grace, 2003; Rosenberg & 
Nielsen, 1997) and, for this reason, is the top event 
(TE) of the risk model. 
 Identify the failure probabilities of safety critical 
systems and barrier elements of the model, based on 
historical databases. 
2 
To reflect specific design and 
operational conditions of safety 
barriers’ systems (top side and 
well) that affect the failure 
probability of these systems. 
 The failure probability of each safety critical barrier 
system must be modeled into its major basic 
elements, accounting for instrumentation 
technology, the elements' arrangement in the 
system, and operational aspects of the system. 
 Map potential interdependency between the safety 
barrier's systems. 
 Identify the failure probabilities of the barrier 
elements of each system based on historical 
databases. 
 Calculate the specific independent failure probability 
of each safety barrier system specific to the rig and 
well. 
3 
To reflect the specificities of risk 
influencing factors (RIF) 
 Identify a group of RIF (Technical and HOF) 
affecting the performance of each safety barrier 
element of Level 1 and 2. 
 Map the relationship between the group of risk 
influencing factors (RIF) and safety barriers' 
elements. 
 Correlate the RIF to the Company’s Safety 
Management System (SMS) to allow verification of 
the adequacy of the RIF, based on the most up-to-
date information from audit programs, inspections, 
and KPI. 
 Quantify the risk influencing factors (RIF) based on 
the proposed axiom and scoring system. 
 
3.2 Axiom and Scoring System 
Bayesian statistics were adopted to solve several variations of problems, mostly involving dynamism and 
uncertainty, as demonstrated by (Pourret, Naim, & Marcot, 2008). Directed acyclic graphs (DAG) are used 
to map the cause-and-effect relationships between barrier elements and systems with the groups of risk 
influencing factors (RIF) that may affect their performance.  
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A basic DAG mapped cause-and-effect relationship between two events (A and B) is based on the simplest 
form of the Bayes' theorem (Equation 1): 
 
𝐏(𝐀 | 𝐁) =
𝐏(𝐁 | 𝐀)𝐏(𝐀)
𝐏(𝐁)
 
(1) 
 P(A) and P(B) are the probabilities of A and B independent of each other;  
 P(A | B), is known as posterior probability, it is the probability of A given that B is true; and 
 P(B | A), is the conditional probability of event B given that event A is true. 
A simple change to the mathematical framework is proposed, changing the focus of the analysis to the term 
P(B | A) instead of the traditional posterior probability term P(A | B), from the most simple form of the 
Bayes' theorem. 
Thus, the updated failure probability of a barrier element or system, in accordance with the conditions of a 
group of ‘n’ risk influencing factors (RIF), is represented by the direct acyclic graph DAG shown in Figure 
2. 
 
Figure 2: DAG representation of failure probability of barrier element or system. 
Equation 2 is a Bayesian inference obtained from the traditional Bayes theorem (Equation 1), with the 
purpose of calculating the posterior failure probability of a barrier element or system given the specific 
conditions of ‘n’ RIF:  
 
P(Ē |C1, C2, … , Cn) = P(Ē) ×  ∏
P(Ci |Ē)
P(Ci)
n
i=1
 
(2) 
Bayesian inference derives the posterior probability as a consequence of two antecedents, a prior 
probability and a probability distribution which, in this case, is derived from observable data:  
 P(Ē | C1, C2, … , Cn)  is the posterior probability (Failure if TRUE and Operational if FALSE) of the 
barrier element or system given the influence of a specific group of risk factors (C1, C2, … , Cn); 
 P(Ē) is the prior failure probability of a barrier element or system. 
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 P(Ci) is a probability distribution that represents the different possible observable conditions (states) 
of a risk influencing factor (Cn) in accordance with the proposed scoring system and axiom; and 
 P(Ci | Ē) is the probability of a specific RIF given Failure (TRUE) or functionality (FALSE) of the 
barrier element, which can be expressed by the conditional probability table (CPT) which complies 
with the APPM axiom. 
This slight adjustment to the mathematical framework is necessary for applying the main axiom of the 
method, the main objectives of which are to simplify the risk-update mechanism and to minimize 
subjectivity. The APPM axiom relies on the following assumptions: 
 Most oil companies prioritize their investments and management efforts seeking to comply with 
industry standards. Also, compliance of RIF in contrast with well-known industry standards is easy 
to measure using traditional elements available in every Oil Company’s Safety Management 
System (SMS). The metric, being simpler, facilitates implementation and reduces the subjectivity 
inherent to Bayesian Network methods, that in most cases relies on the implementation of 
probability elicitation  procedures; and  
 Catastrophic engineering system failures still occur. This leads to the conclusion that the average 
failure probability of an operating engineering system incorporates the socio-technical management 
practices that are designed and implemented to comply with regulations. In other words, accidents 
and failure data banks reflect the failure probabilities of socio-technical systems that, on average, 
have their performance managed to comply with industry standards. However, failure probabilities 
need to be industry specific whenever possible. This is because, as discussed by R., (Pitblado et al., 
2011; Spouge, 2005), generic leak frequencies can change significantly in accordance with the 
industry, including onshore and offshore facilities. Therefore, offshore leak frequencies provide 
more reliable data as they reflect the application of specific industry requirements. 
Based on these two assumptions, a main axiom for the method was established, which is: 
If a RIF (including HOF) complies with industry standards, the failure probability of the barrier element 
affected by the RIF is expected to be approximately equal to the failure probability available from 
historical data banks. Or, in mathematical terms: 
P(Ēi | RIF = IS) ~ P(Ēi) 
(3) 
where, Ēi is defined as the failure of a random event Ei and IS stands for “compliance to Industry 
Standards”. 
Consequently, one can derive the following hypothesis from the proposed axiom: 
 When the scores of the RIFs inherent to a safety barrier lean towards best industry standards, the 
performance of the safety barrier function affected by these RIFs will lean towards high reliability 
performance; 
 When the scores of the RIFs inherent to a safety barrier lean towards complete non-compliance to 
the standard, the performance of the safety barrier function affected by these RIFs will lean towards 
low reliability performance; 
To implement the aforementioned axiom and hypothesis, the RIFs were quantified by combining a four-
scale scoring system (Table 2) and a conditional probability table (CPT), presented in Table 3. This CPT 
was engineered with the single purpose of making the system comply with the proposed axiom and 
sustaining its subsequent hypothesis.  
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Table 2: Description of RIF scoring classification. 
RIF Compliance score Abbreviation Description 
Best practice BP - Control processes associated with the management of a RIF 
that is above what is defined by associated industry standards. 
Industry standard IS - Control processes associated with the management of a RIF 
that complies with associated industry standards. 
Below standard BS - Control processes associated with the management of a RIF 
that does not fully comply with associated industry standards. 
Not adequate NA - Absence or systematic failures of control processes 
associated with the performance management of a RIF. 
 
Table 3: CPT engineered for modeling the effect of a RIF in the performance of the safety barrier in 
accordance with the axiom of the method. 
Scoring System for RIF 
P(Ci | Ē) 
False 
(Barrier Element Operational) 
True 
(Barrier Element Fails) 
BP  :⇔ C1 0,40 0,1 
IS   :⇔ C2 0,25 0,25 
BS  :⇔ C3 0,20 0,275 
NA :⇔ C4 0,15 0,375 
 
 
The CPT was tested using a basic DAG cause-and-effect model. The test consisted of confirming that the 
effect will change in accordance with the axiom and subsequent hypothesis. A prior failure probability of 
5% was represented as the effect P(Ē). Figure 3 presents the results obtained from this analysis and 
demonstrates the compliance of this basic model with the axiom of the method. Figure 4 presents the same 
results in a two-dimensional graph. 
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Figure 3: Basic net for a barrier element with a failure probability of 5%, influenced by a RIF with four 
states. 
 
Figure 4: Updated failure probability of barrier element, given RIF variation.  
Figure 4 presents the four possible updated failure probabilities given the variation of the scoring system 
applied to one specific RIF that affect the performance of a barrier element. The graph shows that the axiom 
and the derived hypothesis meet and can be mathematically described as a linear trend with a determination 
coefficient of R2=97,6%: 
 Main Axiom: P(Ē | C2) = P(Ē); and 
 Derived Hypothesis: P(Ē | C1) <  P(Ē | C2) < P(Ē | C3) < P(Ē | C4); 
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This update procedure, once implemented in all elements of a barrier system, will reflect the conditions of 
the system at a specific operational moment, functioning with the compliance of a group of RIF that affect 
performance. This is demonstrated in Section 4 through the application of the same test on a microscale 
theoretical blowout probability model. 
 
3.3 Design and Implementation of Risk-Based Plan 
Khan et al. (2016) highlight that a Dynamic Risk Analysis (DRA) can actually improve the risk 
management process. They suggest a dynamic risk management framework to ensure the continuous 
improvement of the risk-management process, based on real-time process performance that is revised using 
process and failure history. The application of a dynamic risk management framework enhances the risk 
informed decision-making process by constantly monitoring, evaluating and improving process 
performance.  
The use of safety or risk indicators may allow risk assessment to assume both dynamic and proactive 
features. Appropriate sets of indicators collected and evaluated on a regular basis can provide information 
on overall risk level variation. Indicators on technical equipment can often be automatically retrieved from 
online systems, such as maintenance management systems and condition monitoring systems. Indicators 
for human and organizational factors are generally more difficult to obtain, and rely on manual input and 
assessment (Paltrinieri et al., 2016). 
This sub-section suggests a specific framework for updating DRA, considering the specificities of both this 
method and a drilling project’s life cycle. Figure 5 summarizes this framework. 
 
Figure 5: Risk-based plan framework. 
 
The life cycle of the drilling project starts with the approval of the well design for a specific site. At this 
stage, risks related to the complexity of the well design and geological & geophysical (G&G) conditions 
are known. Consequently, the risk customized for the general characteristics of the drilling project can be 
estimated in accordance with the modeling guidelines of Level 1 of the proposed method.  
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After rig selection, the characteristics of the rig’s drilling systems and Safety Management System (SMS) 
are known, allowing the QRA to be customized by implementing the Level 2 and Level 3 guidelines. At 
this stage, the blowout safety critical systems and RIF are correlated with: applicable key performance 
indicators (KPI), audit and inspection programs encompassing both hardware (equipment/ systems), and 
software (HOF) elements. The assumption that the Company’s SMS is sufficient to monitor and manage 
critical processes against industry standards, the blowout QRA can be customized. This is done by 
reviewing the adequacy of the critical processes and updating the QRA by adjusting it to reflect specific 
system configurations and the scores of the RIF in accordance with the proposed axiom.  
This integration allows for specific conditions of RIF to be accounted for, without the necessity of time-
consuming effort, such as performing sections of probability elicitation involving different types of experts.  
Also, by the time the rig is selected, a risk-based plan reflecting the Plan, Do, Check and Adjust (PDCA) 
philosophy must have been designed. Since the safety critical systems and RIF will have been identified, 
the following additional guidelines must be defined to allow the implementation of the plan during the 
operational phase: 
 PLAN the frequency and strategy for performing periodic reviews aligned with the method’s 
axiom and scoring system. The following processes shall be considered:  drilling reports/ 
operational parameters, SMS and Maintenance KPI, Management of Change (MoC) records, test/ 
inspections results and audit programs related to the Company’s SMS and Maintenance Plan;  
 DO / Implement and record the results of periodic reviews and update the model with new 
evidence based on direct observations and reviews; 
 CHECK and communicate the updated risk to strategic and operational decision makers; 
 ADJUST the process based on the updated risk picture and implement corrective actions whenever 
applicable;  
 
3.4 Expected Advantages and Limitations of the Method 
Table 4 summarizes the most relevant characteristics of the model for different aspects that can be applied 
to assess dynamic risk analysis (DRA). 
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Table 4: Advantages/ Disadvantages of the Accident Precursor BN Method for Modeling Blowout Risks 
Aspects of 
DRA 
Comments 
Preciseness/ 
Subjectivity in 
incorporating 
RIF 
Advantages: 
- The processes of incorporating RIF into the QRA and implementing risk updates and sequential learning 
are less subjective. This is because the traditional probability elicitation process, similar to those reviewed 
by (Zhang & Thai, 2016), is substituted by a process of direct observations combined with a pre-set CPT 
that was engineered to make the model behave in accordance with the pre-defined axiom and subsequent 
hypothesis; 
- The incorporation of RIF into the QRA is transparent (white box) since it relies on a pre-defined 
straightforward axiom and subsequent hypothesis, the consistency of which can be easily tested; 
Disadvantages / Limitations: 
- The method is not free of subjectivity, but its subjectivity relies on the pre-defined CPT and not on a 
probability elicitation process. Sensitivity analyses can be performed to manage this limitation and, if 
required, to review the CPT; 
- The model relies on the same hypothesis defined by (Vinnem et al., 2012), stating that risk control can be 
achieved through the control of changes in the RIF.  Consequently, the precision and sensitivity of the 
model depends on all relevant RIF and conditional dependencies between variables of the model being 
identified and their relationship with risk being known and mapped in the BN; 
Data 
Processing 
and Update 
Capability 
Advantages: 
- The process of incorporating RIF into the QRA and implementing risk updates and sequential learning is 
relatively easy to implement. This is because the inputs required to customize and update the model can be 
obtained from the implementation of the Company’s SMS. This is less time-consuming when compared to 
traditional probability elicitation processes; 
- Neither complex nor high-demand computational processes are required; 
Disadvantages / Limitations: 
- Risk updates and sequential learning are not automatic as they depend upon the implementation of a Risk-
Based Plan. Therefore, the effectiveness of the implementation of the Company’s SMS may impact the 
quality of the information used in the model. 
Mathematical 
features 
Advantages: 
- Capable of dealing with uncertainty and with information from different sources, such as expert judgment, 
observable information or experience, as well as common causes and influences of human factors (Ale et 
al., 2014); (Paltrinieri, Villa, et al., 2016). 
Disadvantages / Limitations: 
- Structural limitations of the Bayesian Network (BN) do not allow consideration of multivariate systems 
with different marginal distributions and complex non-linear dependencies (Khan et al., 2016). 
Risk 
information to 
support 
operational 
decision 
making (*) 
Advantages: 
- The proposed method delivers risk information aligned with what (Yang & Haugen, 2015, 2016) defined 
as criteria for assessing if a certain type of risk information is good (or not) for operational decision making. 
They said that the information should enable comparison with “stop” criteria and be able to be compared 
and ranked against alternatives, should clearly elucidate risk contributing factors, should be updated to 
reflect current operational situation, should reflect future activities, and should be well-structured. 
Disadvantages / Limitations: 
- The stop criteria are not defined by this method. However, the updated blowout probability (output of the 
method) can be combined with any suggested stop criteria. 
(*)The chosen definition of operational decision making for this assessment (Yang & Haugen, 2015, 2016) that 
defines operational decisions is related to operational planning decisions, which are characterized by a relatively 
short time delay between decision and implementation, and mainly have short-term effects. 
Improving 
risk 
management 
process 
Advantages: 
- The dependency of the implementation of the Company’s Safety Management System (SMS) to allow risk 
updates will provide a feedback loop not only for the SMS but also for risk perception and the safety culture 
of operational decision makers and sharp end workers. 
Disadvantages / Limitations: 
- Depends on the effective implementation of the risk-management process itself to allow the feedback. loop. 
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4. MICRO-SCALE APPLICATION OF THE METHOD 
This section demonstrates the application of the method and tests it against the pre-defined axiom in a 
micro-scale blowout risk model. The model adopted in this example reflects the following: blowout while 
drilling into the reservoir (Level 1), Kick detection barrier system (Level 2) and the main risk influencing 
factors that affect the performance of the human element, responsible for detecting and reacting in the event 
of a kick (Level 3). 
4.1 Level 1: Modelling and quantification of a blowout scenario 
The suggested Level 1 blowout (step (i)) was developed using the bow-tie technique in Figure 6. This 
model represents the risk of a blowout when drilling into the reservoir. 
The top event of the bow-tie (in 100% of cases) is the kick (the blowout accident precursor), i.e. the influx 
of hydrocarbon to the wellbore from the reservoir. It depends upon two geological and geophysical (G&G) 
conditions, porosity and permeability. The loss of the primary barrier occurs when the hydrostatic pressure 
(ph) from the mud inside the well is lower than the formation pressure (pf). The event tree (ET) represents 
the escalation from the kick to the blowout and describes the secondary barrier system (well control system). 
 
Figure 6: General blowout bow-tie model. 
Table 5 presents the failure probabilities of the basic events available at Ref (Khan et al., 2016) that were 
calculated based on the failure rates (per 106 hours) available in the (Offshore Reliability Data Handbook, 
2002) data bank. 
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Table 5: Historical data used in the micro-scale analysis for Level 1(Bercha, 1978; Khan et al., 2016; 
Offshore Reliability Data Handbook, 2002). 
Bow-Tie 
Level 1 
Basic Events 
 
Description of the Event 
Prior Failure 
Probability 
E1 Pump failure 4.00 x 10-2 
E2 Power failure 2.70 x  10-4 
E3 Pump control failure 1.00 x 10-3 
E4 Loss of mud due to annular losses 1.00 x 10-2 
E5 Riser rupture 1.00 x 10-2 
E6 Temperature effects leading to lower mud weight 2.50 x 10-3 
E7 Gas-cut mud leading to lower mud weight 7.00 x 10-3 
E8 Failure in density measurement equipment 2.00 x  10-4 
E9 Operator failure in mixing mud 3.00 x 10-2 
E10 Proper G&G conditions for flow (porosity and permeability) 1.25 x 10-1 
E11 Kick detection before hydrocarbon reaches BOP To be calculated (*) 
E12 BOP shuts in the well To be calculated (**) 
(*) The basic “kick detection” event is calculated separately by modeling the barrier systems’ into barrier elements with a specific 
configuration aiming to demonstrate the application of the method (Section 5.2 - Level 2 Demonstration). 
(**) Calculation procedure based on data bank review, presented as follows. 
 
The BOP failure probability can be calculated based upon BOP reliability data. In 2008, several industry 
groups created a task force to define the work scope for a joint industry project to study the BOP reliability 
of wells drilled in the US Gulf of Mexico from 2004 to 2006. The high-level result of the study indicated 
that even though improvements were noted over time, subsea systems actually had better failure rates than 
surface systems (Sattler & Gallander, 2010). In accordance with the same study, the MTTF of a Class VIII 
BOP (the most complex deepwater system) is 121 days. 
Therefore, the BOP failure probability equals P (BOP Fails) = 1-R(t) = 8.23 x 10-3 assuming that failure 
rates are exponentially distributed with failure rate 𝛌, which is constant and independent of time. 
The solution of the micro-scale blowout bow-tie model is obtained by separately calculating the probability 
of kick formation, its escalation to the blowout, and solving the event tree. The kick formation (hydrocarbon 
influx from the reservoir into the wellbore) will occur when adequate geological and geophysical (G&G) 
conditions are available (hydrocarbon under pressure, porosity and permeability) and the hydrostatic 
pressure (Ph) of the mud column is lower than the formation pressure (Pf) (see Equation 4). 
 
(𝐊𝐢𝐜𝐤 𝐅𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧) = 𝐄𝟏𝟎 ∩ (𝒑𝒉 − 𝒑𝒇 < 𝟎) 
P(𝐊𝐢𝐜𝐤 𝐅𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧)=5.02 x 10-3 
(4) 
 
4.2 Level 2: Modeling and quantification of failure rate of barriers’ systems 
The main goal of Level 2 is to model the specifics of the barrier systems and calculate the failure probability 
of blowout barrier systems. Figure 7 presents an example of the performance assessment of the kick 
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detection’s safety barrier system using a fault tree (FT). The safety function of this critical safety barrier is 
to detect the well flow before it reaches the blowout preventer (BOP). To perform the planned safety 
function, at least one operator must recognize specific changes in operational parameters monitored by 
proper instrumentation systems, interpret this information and properly respond to control the kick by 
shutting in the BOP. 
This theoretical example assumed that the driller is responsible for monitoring two independent hardware 
systems: pit instrumentation and drilling instrumentation. This specific aspect of the operational condition 
generates a redundant failure element in the model (E2) in the fault tree presented in Figure 7. The failure 
probability of the basic events of the model are available in Table 6. 
 
 
Figure 7: Fault tree for failure of the kick detection system. 
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Table 6: Historical data used in the micro-scale analysis for Level 2 (Bercha, 1978; Khan et al., 2016; 
Offshore Reliability Data Handbook, 2002). 
Fault Tree Level 2 
Basic Events 
Description of the Event 
Prior Failure 
Probability 
E1 Pit sensor fails 1.40 x 10-4 
E2 Driller fails to interpret drilling instrumentation signs 1.00 x 10-1 
E3 Geologist fails to interpret G&G instrumentation 5.00 x 10-2 
E4 Gas sensor (A) fails 2.00 x 10-4 
E5 Flow meter (A) fails 1.10 x 10-4 
E6 Flow meter (B) fails 2.00 x 10-4 
E7 Gas sensor (B) fails 1.10 x 10-4 
E8 Drill pipe pressure sensor fails 2.00 x 10-4 
 
The fault tree (FT) for failure probability of the Kick Detection Barrier System, presented in Figure 7, was 
mapped into a Bayesian Network (BN). The purpose of mapping the fault tree into a Bayesian network is 
to adjust for the incorporation of RIF affecting the performance of selected barriers of the system that will 
be addressed in Level 3. The nodes of the BN are composed of basic events and sub-systems, connected by 
arcs that define their cause-and-effect relationship.  
Boolean nodes are suitable for modeling the Level 2 barrier systems in a BN as, on a micro scale, it can 
be assumed that the barrier systems are composed of independent variables with two operational 
conditions (Operational state = Yes) and (Not-Operational state = No).  
Table 7 presents the Boolean CPT correlating the three barrier systems that, if all of them failed, would 
cause the kick detection function to fail. 
 
Table 7: CPT for kick detection Bayesian Network. 
 
 
However, the specific configuration of this system presents a redundant failure element (E2). This specific 
condition of the system leads to the adoption of the BN method to facilitate modeling and calculation of the 
failure probability that reflects the redundant failure element. Figure 8 in the sequence presents a BN for 
kick detection failure, modeled and calculated by GENIE Software 2.0 (GENIE SOFTWARE 2.0 
COPYRIGHT 1998-2015, 2015). 
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Figure 8: BN for failure of kick detection safety barrier system. 
The failure probability of the kick detection system P(Ē)=0.05, in Figure 8 above, represented by the 
TRUE state of the central node which shows an approximated value of 1%. The FALSE state stands for the 
probability that the system operates effectively, P(E) = 0.995. 
 
 
4.3 Level 3: Modeling and quantification of RIF 
After modelling the barrier system into a BN (Level 2), it is necessary to identify the risk-influencing factors 
(RIF), including human and organizational factors (HOF) that affect the performance of the barriers. This 
process is what allows the model to be customized for the current operational reality of each rig, by 
incorporating human and organizational factor specifics into the model. 
Table 8 presented below provides examples of RIF that are applicable to the barrier element assessed in 
this example, which is the drilling operator’s performance.  
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Table 8: Examples of risk-influencing factors that can affect the performance of the human operator part 
of a kick detection system. 
# Risk Influencing Factors (RIF) Classification 
1 
The adequacy of the well control procedure to rig systems 
and operational conditions 
Organizational factor 
2 
Clarity of supervision and communication processes 
related to kick detection and reporting 
Organizational factor 
3 Stress due to time pressure for drilling Human factor – Cognitive (slips and lapses) 
4 Work load Human factor – Cognitive (slips and lapses) 
5 Well control drills (training) Human factor – Skill based 
6 Well control competence of the operator Human factor – Skill based 
 
It should be noted that failure of the human operators (driller and geologist) was chosen to demonstrate the 
mapping for Level 3, as human failure is a critical failure mode for kick detection. Based on the work of 
Reason (Reason, 1990), human failures can be divided into three main categories: human error, violations 
and sabotage. ‘Human errors’ may be defined as “occasions in which a planned sequence of mental or 
physical activities fails to achieve its intended outcome, and when these failures cannot be attributed to the 
intervention of some change agency” (Reason, 1990). ‘Violations’ have been defined as “deliberate - but 
not necessarily reprehensible - deviation from those practices deemed necessary (by designers, managers 
and regulatory agencies) to maintain the safe operation of a potentially hazardous system”. ‘Sabotage’ may 
be defined as deliberate actions with a prior intention to damage the system (Reason, 1990). 
A Bayesian network (BN) micro scale blowout risk model was designed for testing the axiom. The Level 
1 bow-tie (BT) and the Level 2 fault tree (FT) were integrated and mapped into a BN. Then, the set of nodes 
representing the human and organizational factors (HOF) presented in Table 8 were connected to the 
applicable barrier elements (human element), in accordance with the mathematical framework represented 
by Equation 2. Figure 9 presents the micro-scale blowout BN risk model. 
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Figure 9: Microscale theoretical blowout BN risk model. 
 
 
Level 1 
Level 2 
Level 3 
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The theoretical micro-scale blowout BN risk model (Figure 9) was tested by the following procedures: 
 randomly changing the states of risk influencing factors (RIF) that affect the reliability of the human 
operators responsible for detecting the kick;  
 updating the states of all RIF and barrier elements of the model in accordance with the major findings 
of the Macondo Blowout reviewed from (Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 2010; Hopkins, 2012) 
and 
 performing a sensitivity analysis. 
The major nodes of the test procedure, in their original state, are highlighted in Figure 9 to facilitate 
visualization and listed as follows:  
 the blowout, which is the major failure being analyzed :⇔ P(Ē)= 6.62 x 10−5 (TRUE); 
 the blowout accident precursor, which has a kick formation probability of  :⇔ P(Ē)= 5.00 x 10-3 
(TRUE); 
 the critical systems related to primary and secondary blowout barriers: 
o Failure of kick detection system  :⇔ P(Ē)= 5.02 x 10-3 (TRUE); and 
o BOP system failure :⇔ P(Ē)= 8.23 x 10-3 (TRUE); 
 the nodes from Level 1 and 2, updated in accordance with the major findings of the Macondo 
Blowout: 
o Level1_E10 stands for proper G&G conditions for kick :⇔ P(Ē)= 1.25 x 10-1 (TRUE); 
o Failure of the Pit System :⇔ P(Ē)= 1.00 x 10-1 (TRUE);, 
 The risk influencing factors (RIF) presented in Table 8 were modeled in accordance with Equation 
2 and the CPT, which was designed to meet the axiom of the method (See Table 3). The discrete 
probability distribution P(Ci) which is generated by this process is shown on the nodes of Level 3 
(RIF) in Figure 9. 
Figure 10 presents the posterior failure probabilities of the kick detection system given the variation of the 
scoring system applied to the RIF presented in the micro-scale example in Figure 9. The same figure 
presents two non-linear trend lines derived from this procedure, one describing the failure probability of 
the kick detection system and the other of the major failure (blowout), as the variation of the former directly 
affects the latter. The derived non-linear curves, represented by the equations also presented in Figure 10, 
have determination coefficients of R2=97,8% and R2=98,6% respectively. 
The non-linear behavior of the failure probability of the kick detection system and, consequently, of the 
blowout probability, is explained by the common risk influencing factors affecting the performance of the 
barrier elements. This system’s arrangement creates a dependence that significantly influences its reliability, 
partly by changing the order of the failure probability equations, as demonstrated by (Xiaowei, 2010).  
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Figure 10: Kick Detection Failure and Blowout Probability Update Given the Variation of Scores 
of RIF for Human Operators. 
The model behaved in accordance with the axiom and its subsequent hypothesis.  When “industry standard” 
was set as the evidence for all RIF, the failure probability of kick detection and blowout probability were 
both equal to the prior probability from failure rate data banks: 
 𝐏(Ē = Failure of Kick Detection |𝐂𝐢 = 𝐈𝐒) = 𝐏(Ē ) =  𝟓. 𝟎𝟎 𝐱 𝟏𝟎
−𝟑; and 
 𝐏(Ē = Blowout |𝐂𝐢 = 𝐈𝐒) = 𝐏(Ē) =  𝟔. 𝟔𝟐 𝐱 𝟏𝟎
−𝟓   
The derived hypothesis is also confirmed, as the variations applied to the scoring of RIF changed the failure 
probability of the safety barrier system from a low reliability standard (~10-1) to a high reliability standard 
(~10-6). As a result, the major failure of the system (blowout probability) was automatically updated. 
It was also noted that the CPT is more sensitive when best industry practices (BP) are set, since this 
prevalence more rapidly leads the system to a high reliability state when compared to the states where the 
RIF are classified as below industry standards. However, this configuration of having all RIF above what 
is expected by industry standards can be considered infrequent, since industry standards are becoming 
stricter and, for this reason, most companies consider their goals against these standards. 
The same model was updated with evidence from the Macondo blowout for testing its capability for 
performing probability updates and sequential learning. For the sake of simplicity, the risk update for the 
Macondo blowout considered the following sequence of selected general evidence gathered from available 
bibliography (Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 2010; Hopkins, 2012): 
 The rig crew knew that there were proper G&G conditions for a blowout, as the well was being 
completed for production; 
 The rig crew bypassed the pit system (one of the redundancies of the kick detection system) to send 
mud from the well to the supply vessel; 
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 It was inferred that organizational factors affecting blowout risk were not adequate at that moment, 
as well as human and organizational factors, as demonstrated in (Hopkins, 2012). 
This simplified evidence from the Macondo Blowout was cumulatively added to the Bayesian network, 
from C1 to C4. Consequently, the blowout risk was updated, as presented in the bar chart at Figure 11. 
Table 9 in the sequence presents the exact values of posterior probability obtained from this test, for 
blowout posterior probability and also for the failure of the kick detection system. 
 
Figure 11: Updated blowout probability, given general evidence collected from the Macondo 
blowout. 
Table 9: Updated kick detection failure and blowout probability, given general evidence collected from 
the Macondo blowout. 
Probability of 
Evidence Set 
in the BN 
Blowout 
Posterior 
Probability 
Kick Detection 
Failure 
Probability 
Description of updated evidence (Cn) 
P(Ē) 6.20 x 10-5 5.00 x 10-3 Prior probability  
P(Ē | C1) 5.30 x10 -4 5.00 x 10-3 Proper G&G conditions for blowout 
P(Ē | C2) 2.32 x 10-3 4.99 x 10-2 Pit system bypassed during completion 
P(Ē | C3) 1.83 x 10-2 4.51 x 10-1 Not adequate organizational factors 
P(Ē | C4) 3.73 x 10-2 9.27 x 10-1 Not adequate human factors 
 
The model also behaved as expected, as the evidence that was updated lead the kick detection system (which 
failed in the Macondo event) into a low reliability state, which lead the blowout probability to increase 
drastically. 
The last test of the micro-scale model consisted of performing a sensitivity analysis for the probability of a 
blowout occurring (Figure 12) and for the failure probability of the kick detection system (Figure 13). 
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Figure 12: Sensitivity analysis for the probability of a blowout occurring. 
 
Figure 13: Sensitivity analysis for the failure probability of the kick detection system. 
It is important to stress that a basic condition applicable to risk modeling was not fulfilled, which is “The 
precision and sensitivity of the model depends on all relevant RIF and conditional dependencies between 
variables of the model being identified and their relationship with risk being known and mapped”. However, 
this limitation is inherent to the nature of a microscale example, not representing the entire system, and 
therefore not directly affecting the sensitivity of the model. 
The micro-scale model only encompasses a very specific part of the entire blowout risk system, as the 
guidelines for modeling Level 2 objectives were exclusively applied to the kick detection system, and the 
objectives defined for Level 3 considered exclusively the HOF affecting the human elements. This effect 
can be perceived by the significance of human operators, represented by the codes Level 2_E3 and 
Level_2_E4 in both graphs, in the behavior of the model, mostly when assessing its impact on the failure 
of the kick detection system alone.   
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The other variables that significantly contribute to the sensitivity of the model, i.e. for the blowout risk, are: 
the BOP, the root causes of lower mud weight, and the availability of adequate G&G conditions for a 
blowout. Therefore, in accordance with the analysis, loss of mud volume appears to be a less relevant 
contributing factor to a blowout while drilling, when compared with lower mud weight. This result is in-
line with the findings of a review of major blowout causes applied to workover (which is similar to drilling 
into the reservoir modeled in this paper) performed by Holand (1997) who presents an overview of the 
causes of the blowouts from the SINTEF database.  
 
5. DISCUSSION OF APPM LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The following remarks discuss the major APPM characteristics with a focus on the limitations that were 
identified by this research paper, and support the suggestions for future work presented afterwards. 
 The method still has structural disadvantages and limitations when compared to other modern DRA 
methods, mostly those that were designed for application in process industries. However, some of 
these characteristics are exactly what makes the proposed method superior for oil drilling, and also: 
o The method is not free of subjectivity. However, its subjectivity is anchored to one 
Conditional Probability Table (CPT), which is testable and transparent in relation to its 
objectives, since it is directly correlated with a clear and easily observable axiom. This 
move from a traditional elucidation process to a axiomatic approach makes the method 
more transparent, less subjective and less time-consuming to apply in real-life projects; 
o Risk updates are dependent on the implementation of a risk-based plan (risk updates are 
not automated). This characteristic can be considered a mathematical disadvantage, but this 
same disadvantage makes it possible to cover all the elements and RIF applicable to a 
drilling blowout, which are highly dependent on G&G factors and HOF (both quite 
uncertain, but measurable using observation techniques). This is also precisely what 
enables the continuous improvement of the Safety Management System (SMS), improve 
situational awareness of operational managers and, consequently, the safety culture related 
to this singular major accident hazard. These combination leads to improved decision-
making processes which are, as demonstrated by Kongsvik et al. (2015), a central 
component of the management of safety-critical operations;   
 The test process was not sufficient to assess the model’s precision and sensitivity due to limitations 
inherent to the micro-scale model, as discussed in the last section. 
From the discussion, the following future work is suggested: 
 To develop a comprehensive blowout risk model in accordance with the APPM. The model must 
integrate all relevant blowout safety barrier systems and RIF, mapping potential conditional 
dependencies between the system’s variables. The comprehensive Bayesian Network blowout risk 
model can be derived from existing models, such as the ones developed by (Abimbola et al., 2014; 
Khakzad et al., 2013). It is expected that a comprehensive model will be more precise, since its 
sensitivity requires all relevant RIF and conditional dependencies between variables to be identified, 
and their relationship with risk to be known and mapped in the BN. This was not accomplished in 
this current research; 
 To detail the three-level modeling guidelines and the framework for implementing a risk-based 
plan aligned with the APPM specifications. Both improvements will facilitate the design and 
implementation of a testing process similar to the one presented by this research paper, but on a 
more realistic scale. This standardization will facilitate other researchers and scientists to apply and 
test the method, and consequently strengthen its scientific basis.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
The APPM for modeling and assessing the risk of deep drilling blowouts was designed to overcome the 
limitations of currently employed QRA methods in the oil and gas industry. The technique has the 
capabilities of: incorporating RIF into QRA, addressing dependability between variables, and allowing risk 
updates using new evidence, considering the specificities inherent to a drilling operation. 
The advantages and disadvantages of the technique, when compared to other similar methods discussed in 
this research work were identified. Most of its characteristics, discussed in the last section, have both 
positive and negative aspects. From this comparison, it was concluded that the APPM is appropriate for 
application to modeling and assessing the risk of blowouts in offshore hydrocarbon drilling projects. 
It shall be highlighted that the axiom of the method, supported by a Bayesian approach, allows the 
incorporation of RIF and risk-updates without the necessity of performing probability elucidation sessions. 
Also, its metrics based on regulatory compliance are transparent, readily available and measurable and, for 
this reason, minimize subjectivity. Its integration with a ‘life’ safety management system SMS using a risk-
based plan should improve risk-based decisions and, consequently, enhance operational decision making. 
The implementation of the method was tested by a theoretical micro-scale blowout risk model, which 
focused on the performance assessment of the ‘kick detection’ barrier function and on the ‘human operator 
detecting kick’ barrier element. The test was considered satisfactory, as it was sufficient to validate the 
behavior of the method and identify opportunities for future work in this scientific field.  
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